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Speak No Evil: Understanding Hermeneutical (In)justice1 
1. Introduction  
Gaps in collective hermeneutical resources stemming from prejudice may result in members of 
marginalized groups being unable to render harmful experiences intelligible to themselves or others 
(Fricker, 2007, pg. 1; Fricker, 2016, pg. 166). Miranda Fricker identifies such situations as instances 
of Hermeneutical Injustice HI. For example, prior to the introduction of the term “sexual harassment,” 
there was a gap2 in the relevant collective understanding – the intersection of hermeneutical 
resources among groups that just about anyone can be expected to draw upon and be understood by 
anyone else (Fricker, 2016, pg. 161). This lacuna hindered attempts by, say, women harassed in the 
workplace, from fully understanding these harmful experiences.  
Fricker’s original presentation of HI left open theoretical choice points leading to criticisms 
(Dotson, 2012; Mason, 2013; Medina, 2013) and subsequent clarifications (Fricker, 2016) with the 
resulting dialectic appearing largely verbal. The absence of perspicuous exposition of hallmarks of 
HI might suggest scenarios exhibiting some – but not all – such hallmarks are within its purview 
when they are not. The lack of clear hallmarks of HI, moreover, obscures both the extent to which 
Fricker’s proposed remedy Hermeneutical Justice HJ – roughly, virtuous communicative practices – 
 
1Acknowledgements: Many thanks to Hansen Breitling, Eskil Elling, Christiana Eltise, Alicia Kennedy, Hollen Reischer, 
and Kasey-Hettig-Rolfe and for various discussions on the content of this paper. Hollen, in particular, deserves more 
thanks than I can express here, due to patience, insights, and influence it is hard to identify in brief. Thanks to Beth 
Barker, Susan Bencomo, Nathaly Garcia, Sandy Goldberg, Regina Hurley, Nate Lauffer, Mauricio Mulaff Masi, Gisela 
Reyes, Jon Vandenburgh, and Stephen White for critical feedback over two talks which vastly improved the content. I 
am, moreover, eternally grateful to Megan Hyska, Jose Medina, William Paris, and an anonymous reviewer at Episteme 
for insightful, supportive, critical feedback on previous drafts. I am fortunate to be part of such a strong philosophical 
community.  
2Not all “gaps” result in HI. First, it is plausible collective hermeneutical resources contain a confounding surplus 
resulting in, say, suspension of belief. But since this “gap” operates at the level of belief it will not result in HI (Fricker, 
2016). Second, agents who have not inferred implicit resources from explicit hermeneutical resources exhibit a “gap” 
but this also operates at the level of belief. Corollary: generating new hermeneutical resources must sometimes arise ex 
nihilo. Suppose otherwise. Presumably, a conceptual definition corresponding to the phrase “sexual harassment” could 
have been constructed by Woods prior to introducing the term based on available conceptual resources, e.g. this or that 
behavior with this or that intention. But that suggests “sexual harassment” was implicit in the existing resources and 
Woods simply failed to identify it. Hence, this is a failure at the level of belief and so not HI. But this is HI. Hence, the 
concept was not implicit in existing resources.  
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adequately addresses the injustice, and the accuracy of criticisms suggesting that HJ is insufficient to 
the task.  In what follows, after briefly defending necessary and sufficient conditions for what I take 
to be the best candidate interpretation of HI, I defend a rigorous explication of HJ.  
More specifically, in Section 2 I argue in favor of necessary and sufficient conditions for HI 
and show how they might clarify verbal disputes. In Section 3, I explicate HJ as cultivation of 
virtuous conversational skills directed towards charitable understanding of marginalized speakers. I 
articulate epistemic and moral aspects of HJ as independently motivated context-sensitive standing 
responsibilities we all share and - building on previous work (Beverley, 2016; Beverley & Beebe, 
2017) - observe one consequence of understanding HJ in this manner is that certain agents may bear 
substantial responsibilities in contexts exhibiting HI. In Section 4, noting Fricker might balk at such 
a consequence since HI is a structural injustice often lacking perpetrators, I show there is conceptual 
space in Fricker’s account for responsibility I claim should constitute HJ, suggest the proposed 
context-sensitive principles may provide responses to critics who question the efficacy of Fricker’s 
characterization of HJ, and illustrate how these principles provide clear mechanisms for analyzing 
responsibility among clinical psychologists and in cases where marginalized individuals might be 
expected to educate privileged individuals. Given the explanatory benefits, plausibility of 
applications, etc., I conclude Fricker has overwhelming reasons to adopt the explication of HJ 
offered here.  
2. Explicating Hermeneutical Injustice 
Fricker’s initial characterization of HI as gaps in collective epistemic resources underwritten by 
prejudice, left room for interpretation. Following (Goetze, 2018)’s characterization, some (Dotson, 
2012; Mason, 2013) understood “collective epistemic resource” as the only available epistemic 
resources across marginalized and non-marginalized communities. This reading entailed 
marginalized groups could not in principle develop local epistemic resources; either everyone had a 
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given epistemic resource or no one did. Since marginalized groups clearly do develop local epistemic 
resources not necessarily shared by the collective, Fricker’s characterization of HI thus seemed 
problematically exclusionary. Others (Medina, 2013) understood “collective epistemic resource” as 
the union of epistemic resources across marginalized and non-marginalized communities, but argued 
Fricker’s account of HI overlooked ways in which members of marginalized communities develop 
local hermeneutical resources to understand harmful experiences. Marginalized individuals might 
avoid HI when reflecting on harmful experiences or communicating with other members of their 
local community, but experience HI when attempting to communicate with non-marginalized 
individuals who lack those local hermeneutical resources. Fricker’s initial characterization of HI 
seemed to overlook this distinction.  
2.1 Verbal Disputes, Conceptual Gaps, and Extension 
Fricker (Fricker, 2016) clarified “collective” was to be understood as the intersection of epistemic 
resources any member of the relevant community could be expected to have access to. This allows 
that marginalized communities may have local epistemic resources not shared by the larger 
community, and so avoids concerns of the first sort. To address concerns of the second sort, Fricker 
extended3 the initial characterization of HI to a spectrum of species of the phenomena. On one 
boundary are paradigmatic cases of HI - Carmita Wood experiencing sexual harassment before 
coining the term - called maximal HI, since the gap in collective epistemic resources is global. On the 
other boundary are cases where the gap in collective resources is local, called minimal HI, which 
involve marginalized individuals sufficiently equipped with hermeneutical resources to understand 
their harmful experiences, but who are unable to be understood by those lacking the same resources. 
 
3Fricker claims “…a commitment to the existence of localized interpretive practices…is present…in the…original 
account of hermeneutical injustice.” (Fricker, 2016, pg. 167). I am skeptical. First, extending the original theory to 
maximal/minimal HI hardly shows they were implicit; theory extensions are cheap. One can consistently extend a 
minimal linear order to either a dense or discrete order, but not both. Similarly, Fricker’s original account could be 
consistently extended in ways inconsistent with maximal/minimal HI. Second, appealing to Joe (Fricker, 2016, pg. 
2016) as hermeneutically marginalized as evidence of minimal HI is questionable (Romdenh-Romluc, 2016).  
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Fricker claims Joe from the novel Enduring Love exhibits minimal HI: Joe is being stalked by a 
religious zealot, but is unable to articulate his harmful experiences to police, as his stalker has not - 
strictly speaking - committed a crime.4    
 The preceding disputes, it seems, stemmed largely from ambiguity in Fricker’s initial 
presentation of HI; Fricker’s clarifications seem adequate to address the concerns. More clarification 
seems needed, however, as evidenced by recent discussion of whether scenarios involving certain 
types of abuse exhibit HI. One concern is that HI involving individuals ‘unable to render a harmful 
experience intelligible’ is ambiguous. It might be understood as suggesting HI is present even if an 
individual does not attempt to render harmful experiences intelligible as long as they would have 
difficulty were they to try. It might alternatively be understood as suggesting HI is present only 
when there are attempts to render a harmful experience intelligible. Clearing this up is important 
since, as one example, Jose Medina has claimed marginalized individuals who are persistently and 
extensively excluded from participating in meaning-making and meaning-sharing, may experience a 
species of HI he calls hermeneutical death, the loss of the capacity to participate in these practices 
(Medina, 2017a; 2017b). But if HI as Fricker understands requires an individual actually struggle to 
make sense of such experiences, then it seems hermeneutical death does not count as HI. From 
another direction, even assuming the relevant gap is understood as the intersection of collective 
hermeneutical resources, it is unclear whether Fricker’s characterization of HI requires a literal 
absence of resources, or allows that gaps might arise due to a surplus of resources, some being 
obscured by others. Katherine Jenkins, for example, recently applied (Jenkins, 2017, pg. 191-2) 
Fricker’s account of HI to cases of domestic abuse and sexual violence, arguing that when persistent 
social misunderstandings of, say, domestic abuse conflict with relevant legal definitions – as often 
 
4This is precisely the case Fricker used to introduce incidental HI (Fricker, 2007, pgs. 156-8); Fricker’s suggestion that 
minimal HI was already included in the original account, suggests these are the same phenomenon.   
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occurs during domestic abuse trials - victims may struggle to render experienced harms intelligible. 
Jenkins concludes such cases exhibit HI. However, if HI requires a literal absence of hermeneutical 
resources – rather than allowing the gap may exist due to a surplus of resources obscuring those 
needed to understand the harmful experience – then the phenomenon Jenkins identifies does not, in 
fact, count as HI.5 From yet another direction, Fricker claims the relevant gap in collective 
hermeneutical resources must stem from hermeneutical disadvantage to count as HI, but this runs 
the risk of overlooking that individuals often have hermeneutical disadvantages and advantages, as 
well as the importance of how such asymmetries arise and are sustained.6   
  So, though our main goal in this article is explication of the remedy of HI, it is worth 
clarifying hallmarks of the injustice, so we have the target phenomenon in full view. Given the 
remaining ambiguity in Fricker’s presentations of HI, it is not enough to simply quote Fricker. We 
must instead excavate some of these hallmarks ourselves.7  
2.2 Manifestation Condition and Hermeneutical Marginalization 
Consider a paradigmatic case of HI:   
CASE 1: Sue was abused from childhood to adolescence and developed coping skills 
which disinclined Sue from reflecting on harmful experiences, e.g. habits of ignoring 
psychological/physical pain, tendency to dissociate,8 fusion with thoughts, etc. As an 
adult, Sue realizes her psychological development and dispositions differ significantly 
from acquaintances. Sue eventually acquires cognitive dispositions that incline her to 
reflect on and attempt to render intelligible past experiences of trauma and how they 
influence her present identity and interpersonal relationships. However, in Sue’s 
community there are no collective resources adequate for understanding what we 
would characterize as child abuse and this absence owes to structural prejudice 
 
5See (Mason, 2020) who observes this commitment of Fricker’s, but argues HI should be understood more broadly.  
6(Simion, 2018, pg. 315-6) claims – contra Fricker – what is essential to HI is that it is brought about unjustly, rather 
than via unjust marginalization as advantaged groups may be treated unjustly. Given the supplement to Fricker’s 
account outlined below, namely, of weighing hermeneutical advantages to disadvantages in the analysis of 
hermeneutical marginalization, Fricker can make sense of Simion’s example without needing to expand constraints on 
HI. See (Mason, 2020) for additional discussion.  
7Many thanks to an anonymous reviewer at Episteme whose comments suggested I emphasize this point.  
8(van Loon & Kralik, 2005) and (Ward, 1988) illustrate childhood coping strategies manifesting in adulthood, e.g. 
repression, emotional insulation, dissociation. These “avoidant strategies” (Futa, Nash, Hansen, & Garbin, 2003) help 
create a sense of control through avoiding emotions.  
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concerning women and children. Consequently, Sue struggles and fails to render her 
harmful experiences intelligible to herself and others.  
Reflection on CASE 1 reveals hallmarks of HI.9 In various places, Fricker maintains HI arises only 
when an agent struggles to make sense of an experience.10, 11 The when and where of HI is tethered to those 
affected who try and fail to render their experiences intelligible. This implies if an agent is not 
attempting to render their harmful experience intelligible, there is no HI. Fricker thus accepts what I 
will call the Manifestation Condition (MC):  
MC Case C12 involving agent S exhibits HI only if S attempts to render a relevant 
harmful experience intelligible in C 
MC might initially appear problematic. Suppose Sue is busy at work, momentarily distracted, or 
sleeping, and so not attempting to make sense of her harmful experiences. If MC is true, Sue is not 
subjected at those times to an injustice that undermines her abilities to render her experiences 
intelligible. That seems false.  
 But this is too quick.13 Fricker distinguishes HI from Hermeneutical Marginalization HM: a 
state of affairs exhibiting non-accidental inequality between individuals or groups that provides the 
background condition against which instances of HI manifest.14 An analogy makes the point clear: 
 
9It is worth noting Fricker’s characterization of epistemic injustice has gained traction among psychology researchers 
keen on developing intervention strategies for individuals exhibiting symptoms similar to those described here 
(Sullivan, 2019; Kyratsous & Sanati, 2016; Kverme, et. al., 2019) 
10“…hermeneutical injustice comes only when the background condition is realized in a more or less doomed attempt…to 
render an experience intelligible...” (Fricker, 2007, pg. 159); “The hermeneutical inequality that exists, dormant, in a 
situation of hermeneutical marginalization erupts in injustice only when some actual attempt at intelligibility is 
handicapped...” (Fricker, pg. 159). Italics added.  
11(Goetze, 2018)’s revised definition of hermeneutical injustice reflects MC as well: “…primary harm of hermeneutical 
injustice is that the subject has some…social experience that at some crucial moment lacks intelligibility.” As does 
(Hanel, 2017, pg. 2010) “As long as the subject of hermeneutical disadvantage undertakes no attempt to understand her 
experience…there is no hermeneutical injustice…”  
12Embedded in “case” as used in what follows is a temporal index, e.g. “at time t”.  
13But not uncharitable: “A hermeneutical injustice is done when a collective hermeneutical gap impinges so as 
to…disadvantage some group(s)…which…is effectively discriminatory.” (Fricker, 2007, pg. 162) “…the conceptual 
lacuna which handicaps her as an interpreter of her experience entails a hermeneutical injustice. (Fricker, 2012)  
14“…the conditions of hermeneutical injustice (namely, hermeneutical marginalization)…” (Fricker, 2006, pg. 174); 
“…hermeneutical marginalization…leaves practitioners susceptible to hermeneutical injustice whenever they should 
attempt to render the experience intelligible…” (Fricker, 2016, pg. 166); “…hermeneutical injustice and its 
precondition, hermeneutical marginalization.” (Jenkins & Fricker, 2017, pg. 268) “…the primary harm of hermeneutical 
injustice consists in situated hermeneutical inequality…” (Fricker, 2007, pg. 162). See too (Goetze, 2018, pg. 81). 
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Salt is disposed to initiate a dissolving process, if placed in background conditions, but salt being so 
disposed does not entail it ever will; dispositions and associated processes are only correlated 
(Williams, 2019; Smith, 2016; Lowe, 2006). Analogously, Fricker seems to hold: agents are to salt as 
HM is to water and as manifesting HI is to dissolving. This analogy makes sense of CASE 1, which 
exhibits HM, dispositions to manifest HI, and manifestation of HI. Hence, this counts as an 
instance of HI. And it also makes sense of why nearby scenarios which exhibit HM but not MC, do 
not count as instances of HI. Individuals in such cases are more like iron than salt, in a cup of water. 
And neither HI nor dissolving necessarily manifests in such respective setups. If the preceding 
analogy correctly describes the relationship between HI and HM, then it seems Fricker is 
committed to:  
HI-HM If case C exhibits HI, then C exhibits HM 
Which links manifestations to background conditions and makes all the difference when responding 
to the above objection. While Sue is not struggling to render her harmful experiences intelligible to 
herself or others, she nevertheless operates against this background condition which would 
undermine her attempts at doing so, and in that way is marginalized.15 Our objector may be 
unmoved, and insist Sue in CASE 1 exhibits HI even when, say, sleeping.16 But it is not clear what is 
gained in claiming HI in this case over mere HM. Moreover, rejecting MC suggests there is little to 
distinguish HI and HM making it unclear what role this distinction plays in Fricker’s theory. 
Altogether then: Reflection on CASE 1 suggests two hallmarks of HI, namely, that relevant 
 
15It is in this respect that marginalized individuals operate under “holes in the ozone layer.” (Fricker, 2006, pg. 161).  
16More charitably, one might reject MC for a weaker necessary condition on HI, namely, that agents need only be 
disposed to render harmful experiences intelligible. Call this the Disposition Condition (DC). Understanding HI in this 
manner suggests Sue exhibits HI when busy, sleeping, etc., if she has the relevant cognitive dispositions. Besides there 
being textual support for Fricker accepting MC rather than the weaker DC, there seem theoretical benefits. With DC 
accepted, HI appears little different from HM, suggesting hermeneutical justice is proposed to address something 
nearby to HM. But seeking to address HM by simply cultivating virtues of listening seems – to put it bluntly – 
ineffective at best and problematically insensitive at worst.  
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individuals must at least attempt to render harmful experiences intelligible and this must operate 
against a background of hermeneutical marginalization.17  
2.3 Coercion, Hermeneutical Disadvantage, and Advantage 
Consider next:  
CASE 2: Sally became pregnant at 15, dropped out of school, married at 16, had 
more children with her husband Mike, and was a “house wife” who relied on Mike 
for support. Mike was psychologically and physically abusive. Sally developed coping 
skills which disinclined Sally from reflecting on these harmful experiences, e.g. habits 
of ignoring psychological/physical pain, tendency to dissociate, fusion with thoughts, 
etc. Over time, Sally’s developed coping mechanisms prevented her from attempting 
to make sense of her experiences.18    
Let us further suppose there is no gap in the collective hermeneutical resources, but that Sally is 
unable to access those resources owing to coping mechanisms. Importantly, Sally is not struggling to 
render her experience intelligible, so CASE 2 is not an instance of HI. However, it is plausible 
CASE 2 exhibits HM. Moreover, there is a positive reason for treating CASE 2 as at least exhibiting 
HM. Since Sally self-imposed coping mechanisms, rejecting CASE 2 as exhibiting HM seems close 
to victim blaming,19 i.e. claiming Sally is not hermeneutically marginalized, but perhaps 
inappropriately self-imposes coping mechanisms making her epistemically culpable. Of course, 
rejecting CASE 2 as HM does not entail characterization of Sally in a way that supports victim-
blaming. Still, it seems plausible if there is an alternative characterization of CASE 2 that does not so 
 
17With these remarks we have identified hallmarks of HI sufficient to address (Medina, 2017a, pg. 41-2)’s remarks 
concerning hermeneutical death. Such scenarios do not exhibit MC and so do not exhibit HI as Fricker understands, 
though they perhaps exhibit some other form of epistemic injustice. These results shift the dialectical burden to Medina 
to provide reasons for thinking such scenarios should count as HI. Note, moreover, replacing MC with the weaker DC 
discussed in the preceding footnote provides no help here. Presumably, those exhibiting hermeneutical death lack 
relevant dispositions needed to participate in meaning-making and sharing practices. MC and DC both exclude 
hermeneutical death from counting as HI, as they both exclude CASE 1, though for different reasons.   
18CASE 2 perhaps involves testimonial smothering (Dotson, 2012). For example, Sally might over time recognize that 
reflecting on the abuse she experiences inclines her to resist, which leads to further abuse. Sally may instead focus on 
minimizing the abuse, i.e. ‘walking on eggshells’, catering to Mike, etc. CASE 2 exhibits more than testimonial 
smothering, however, since Sally – after developing the relevant coping mechanisms - eventually does not reflexively 
silence based on assessment of her audience. We might refer to this phenomenon as hermeneutical smothering, identifying 
testimonial smothering carried to the point of unreflective habit as one route to this injustice.  
19(Jenkins, 2016, pg. 10) makes a similar point involving rape/abuse myths as confounding hermeneutical resources.  
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easily lend itself to such a reading, then we should prefer that alternative. I will thus assume our task 
in what follows is to discover how to classify CASE 2 as exhibiting HM while remaining consistent 
with Fricker’s commitments.  
Yet, there may be reasons to think CASE 2 does not exhibit HM. Fricker claims one cannot 
simply “opt in” (Fricker, 2006, pg. 153) to HM, e.g. become a hermit. Sally self-imposing coping 
mechanisms seems rather close to opting in. But Sally is not simply opting into HM. Sally is coerced 
into developing coping mechanisms. The importance of coercion to HM is supported by observing 
Fricker claims in cases of HI – and so HM - the absence of resources needed for mutual 
understanding of harmful experiences is not accidental,20 suggesting coercion is involved in HI. And 
since HI is a structural phenomenon (Fricker, 2007; Fricker, 2016), lacking obvious perpetrators in 
paradigm cases, it is plausible to locate this “local marshalling of forces against attempts to render 
intelligible harmful experiences” in the background conditions against which HI manifests, i.e. HM. 
If correct, we should expect to find coercion associated with HM too.  
We can appeal to Fricker’s recent discussion of the potential overlap between HI and White 
Ignorance (Fricker, 2016, pg. 174-5) for guidance here. The relevant case Fricker examines for our 
purposes is (Fricker, 2016, pg. 174-5): 
IGNORE: Non-culpably ignorant white people in an environment where 
hermeneutical resources have been suppressed and knowledge cannot be accessed as 
population lacks needed concepts for acquiring this knowledge. 
Fricker claims IGNORE exhibits both white ignorance and HI. But note, if coercion alone were 
sufficient for HM, then it is plausible members of the relevant white population might also be 
subjected to HM too, since it is not difficult to imagine, say, the suppression of relevant concepts 
and knowledge needed to understand the experiences of marginalized individuals is coerced, e.g. 
 
20“…the whole engine of collective social meaning was effectively geared to keeping these obscured experiences out of 
sight.” (Fricker, 2007, pg. 153). In other words, HI is not a matter of bad luck or accident.  
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through education, parents, propaganda, etc. Even under such conditions, however, it seems 
incorrect to say the ignorant members of the white population are subject to HM. This suggests a way 
to understand the role of coercion in Fricker’s account of HI. While ignorant white individuals in 
the relevant cases do not exhibit HM, they exhibit Hermeneutical Disadvantage (HD), i.e. a deficit in 
subjects’ abilities to contribute to collective epistemic resources (Fricker, 2016, pgs. 173-5):21  
HM-HD If case C exhibits HM, then C exhibits HD 
In addition to HD, ignorant whites in these cases also exhibit significant Hermeneutical Advantage HA, 
i.e. a surplus in subjects’ abilities to contribute to collective epistemic resources. HA alone is 
insufficient to show a case does not exhibit HM22 since groups often exhibit both HA and HD. 
What seems crucial to determining whether HM is exhibited is the ratio of quantity/quality of HA 
to HD. We need not attempt to make this precise.23 Let P denote a quantitative and qualitative 
combination of HA; let Q denote a quantitative and qualitative combination of HD; let T denote 
some fixed positive real number. It suffices to say a case counts as HM with respect HA and HD if 
T < P/Q, and a case does not count as HM if T > P/Q. In other words, in a given context, a case 
counts as HM if the hermeneutical advantages weighed against disadvantages results in a number 
below a certain threshold which – perhaps – allows for indeterminate or borderline cases. So, 
ignorant white individuals in IGNORE do not exhibit HM, since the ratio of advantages to 
disadvantages is plausibly greater than any reasonable specification of T and non-white individuals in 
IGNORE are plausibly more disadvantaged than they are advantaged, so there is HM. Altogether: 
To exhibit HM, local marshalling of forces must play to the coerced disadvantage of a group. These 
 
21See (Fricker, 2007, pgs. 151-2). Here we find room for (Simion, 2018)’s observation that privileged individuals may be 
treated unjustly and, moreover, hermeneutically disadvantaged, without expanding Fricker’s characterization of HI.  
22Fricker approvingly cites (Medina, 2012, pg. 108) who argues convincingly that members of dominant groups are in 
some ways epistemically disadvantaged, even though they are clearly advantaged. Similarly, members of marginalized 
groups may have epistemic advantages, though they are clearly disadvantaged too. This strongly suggests HA does not 
undermine HM since otherwise marginalized groups would not exhibit the latter if they exhibit the former.   
23I agree with Aristotle that one should only seek precision to the extent one’s domain permits. Here we find a limit. 
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observations provide an explanation for why CASE 2 exhibits HM: Sally is coerced resulting in a 
proportion of HA to HD below some reasonable specification of T.  
 Fricker’s discussion of White Ignorance reveals one more hallmark of HI, illustrated by 
reflection on the following (Fricker, 2016, pg. 173):  
DISBELIEF: Non-culpably ignorant white people in an environment where 
hermeneutical resources needed to make sense of harmful experiences exist in the 
collective hermeneutical resource, but have been suppressed, forgotten, or never 
learned.     
Fricker claims members of the relevant marginalized population attempting to render their harmful 
experiences intelligible to ignorant members of the white population in DISBELIEF are not 
subjected to HI since the inability of the white individuals to make sense of these harmful 
experiences stems from epistemically culpable behaviors,24 e.g. failing to infer from existing concepts 
needed conceptual resources to understand. Contrast this result with IGNORE - which exhibits HI 
– where marginalized individuals fail to render their experiences intelligible to white individuals due 
to a literal gap in the collective conceptual resources. This is to say, whether HI is present trades on 
whether communication or understanding breaks down due to needed concepts for comprehension 
being obscured or being absent. If the former, there is not HI; if the latter, there may be HI.25 
2.4 Hallmarks of HI 
Combining these observations provide necessary and sufficient conditions for HI:  
SF-HI Case C involving agents S and S’ exhibits HI just in case: 
(1) C exhibits HM26  
(2) S struggles to render a harmful experience intelligible to S’  
(3) S’ fails to understand S due to S’ lacking conceptual resources 
 
24(Fricker, 2016, pg. 173-5). This is, as Fricker puts it, a failure at the level of belief rather than conceptual resources.  
25This hallmark weighs against (Jenkins, 2018)’s counting as HI cases where surplus hermeneutical resources concerning 
domestic abuse and sexual violence lead to victims experiencing difficulties in rendering these experiences intelligible to 
themselves or others. This is not to say these cases do not exhibit some other form of epistemic injustice, it is simply to 
suggest it is not HI.  
26Because T > P/Q and coercion is involved.   
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(4) Gap in (3) is not due to epistemically culpable27 behaviors by either S or S’ 
Where S and S’ may be the same individual, e.g. Carmita Wood; Sue in CASE 1. Having identified 
necessary and sufficient conditions for HI, we turn next to explicating Fricker’s proposed remedy to 
this injustice, which has received far less attention than the injustice.  
3. Explicating Hermeneutical Justice 
Fricker proposed Hermeneutical Justice HJ - a cultivated virtue consisting of sensitivity to the 
hermeneutical difficulties marginalized speakers confront when attempting to render experiences 
intelligible to others – as a remedy to HI.28 Beyond characterizing HJ as a cultivated virtue, little has 
been added to this initial presentation. In this section, I approach HJ through the lens of moral and 
epistemic harms, independently motivate moral and epistemic principles underwriting 
responsibilities that may be magnified based on context, and argue attention to contextual elements 
influencing attribution of moral and epistemic responsibility provides an explanation for the 
significant responsibilities privileged individuals may have in conversations with marginalized 
individuals struggling to communicate harmful experiences.  
3.1 Moral Aspect of HJ: First Pass 
Fricker divides (Fricker, 2007, pg. 163-5) the harms of HI into primary (always present with the 
phenomenon) and secondary (often present with the phenomenon). The primary harm of HI is that 
agents are unable to render harmful experiences intelligible; secondary harms include practical 
consequences of the primary harm, e.g. doubting oneself, denial of unemployment claims, etc. 
Secondary harms may in term compound primary harms. HJ is meant to remedy both primary and 
secondary harms. Indeed, understanding the harms of HI in this manner leads naturally to 
 
27For example, not gathering easily accessible evidence, knowingly ignoring easily accessible concepts, etc.  
28(Fricker, 2007, pg. 169). Virtuous listeners recognize relevant speakers are “struggling with an objective difficulty and 
not a subjective failing.” (Goetze, 2018, pg. 88) emphasized HJ as a requirement for marginalized individuals 
attempting to render experiences intelligible to themselves, not just to others. 
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observing a way to address the primary harm, namely, creating space in which marginalized 
individuals may safely engage in the difficult task of understanding and communicating relevant 
harmful experiences. And if HJ adequately addresses the primary harm of HI then it is plausible to 
think the secondary harms will be addressed too. This is, broadly speaking, Fricker’s characterization 
of HJ. At the same time, however, understanding harms associated with HI in terms of this 
dichotomy leads less naturally to reflection on what responsibilities individuals have to address 
primary and secondary harms, beyond merely cultivating good listening habits and - perhaps more 
importantly – leads less naturally to reflection on how responsible parties might address these harms. 
It is, moreover, no surprise Fricker does not examine in detail responsibilities of individuals while 
discussing HJ, since HI is a structural injustice often lacking individual perpetrators.  
An alternative characterization29 of HI harms – as moral or epistemic – is both broader than 
the primary/secondary distinction Fricker indexes to HI and provides an obvious link to 
responsibility. In broad outline, moral harms are harms to an individual insofar as they are an 
autonomous moral agent, epistemic harms are harms to an individual insofar as they are a source or 
creator of knowledge, and the presence of either harm suggests the presence of some corresponding 
moral or epistemic responsibility. The utility of framing harms in this manner is best illustrated by 
examining how they both align with Fricker’s understanding of HJ while explaining what 
responsible parties can do to address HI more specifically than simply cultivating listening habits. 
So, we will do just that.  
Specifically, in what follows we frame HI as both moral and epistemic harms, and 
consequently, understand HJ as involving corresponding moral and epistemic responsibilities. 
Unfortunately, this framing alone does not get us far in understanding Fricker’s HJ, since Fricker 
provides little specification of this putative remedy. Fortunately, we can make progress on the moral 
 
29(Fricker, 2016) observes the moral and epistemic aspects of HI in various places.  
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aspect by relying on recent literature (Beverley, 2016) supporting context-dependent principles 
underwriting widely accepted (Beverley & Beebe, 2017) judgments of moral responsibility. 
Independent of Fricker’s discussion of HJ it seems the following is true:   
NON-MALFEASANCE For agents S, S’, context C, and action A: If A harms S’ in 
C then S has a prima facie moral responsibility in C not to 
perform A   
This hardly needs defending. We seem to have a default moral responsibility not to harm others, and 
whether we have such a responsibility appears to vary by context. If James learns that whenever he 
taps his feet in class it causes Sally tremendous pain, then James in this context plausibly has a moral 
responsibility to refrain from that behavior. In such a context, NON-MALFEASANCE applies to 
James. On the other hand, if James taps his feet to alleviate his own tremendous discomfort at 
having to sit in seminar, and this merely causes Sally slight discomfort, it seems plausible James does 
not have a moral responsibility to refrain. In this context, the responsibility adverted in NON-
MALFEASANCE does not apply to James. These observations suggest certain features of context 
are relevant to whether an agent has a moral responsibility in that context, namely, perceived degree 
of harm done by an action and cost to an agent for refraining from that action.  
 Judgments of moral responsibility vary with respect to other contextual features, often 
intimately tied to the preceding. For example, it seems mistaken to attribute moral responsibility to 
refrain from a given action to agents who are genuinely unable to refrain from that action. This 
suggests judgments that an individual is morally responsible for refraining from some action track 
whether the agent is perceived as able to refrain or not.30 Similarly, it seems mistaken to attribute 
moral responsibility to agents who are able to refrain from actions that cause harm to others, but 
 
30Whether this intuition is general is an open question, though the present balance of evidence suggests most intuitively 
believe if an individual is responsible for some action then they can perform that action. See (Kurthy, Lawford-Smith, 
& Sousa, 2017) for recent empirical discussion.  
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who are genuinely unaware that they are able to refrain from those actions. Related, agents who 
know they can refrain from such actions but who do not realize those actions are harmful to others 
also seem outside the scope of moral responsibility as codified in NON-MALFEASANCE. What 
these brief outlines of philosophical and empirical results defended elsewhere suggest is that 
judgments of moral responsibility are sensitive not only to perceived harm to individuals and cost to 
the potential bearer of responsibility, but also to the knowledge of the bearer’s ability and bearer’s 
knowing a given action is harmful.  
Though NON-MALFEASANCE is motivated independently of Fricker’s discussion of 
HJ, it is an easy fit. Presumably, each of us has a moral responsibility to refrain from, say, 
contributing to difficulties marginalized individuals have when attempting to communicate harmful 
experiences, since such contribution is often harmful. NON-MALFEASANCE, moreover, fits 
with Fricker’s characterization of HI as structural, and so generating limited responsibility with 
respect to individuals. NON-MALFEASANCE does not exactly capture Fricker’s characterization 
of HJ, however. Fricker (Fricker, 2012, pg. 259-60; Fricker, 2016) suggests HJ may also involve 
active dissemination of information concerning the causes of marginalization, e.g. implicit bias, and 
Fricker has adopted a “whatever works” approach to addressing structural marginalization (Fricker, 
2010, pg. 166). NON-MALFEASANCE does not provide sufficient responsibility to underwrite 
active involvement in addressing the injustice.    
3.2 Moral Aspect of HJ: Second Pass 
Reflecting further on the preceding observations reveals the lines along which to motivate stronger 
moral principles. Each of the preceding contextual features may magnify moral responsibility across 
contexts, as again strongly suggested by recent philosophical (Beverley, 2016) and empirical research 
(Beverley & Beebe, 2017) exploring patterns of judgments of moral responsibility. Consider, if James 
can save Sally’s life by donating blood plasma, which has little cost to James, then it seems James has 
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a moral responsibility to accept this minimal cost to himself to prevent a substantial harm to Sally.31 
James thus appears to bear a responsibility to accept a minimal cost to himself to prevent great harm 
- independent of his involvement in generation of that harm - and this moral responsibility is more 
than simply refraining from engaging in a harmful action, i.e. more substantial than NON-
MALFEASANCE. On the other hand, if the only way James can save Sally’s life is by sacrificing 
his own, then it does not seem James has a moral responsibility to do so, again suggesting judgments 
of moral responsibility are sensitive to tradeoffs of harms to individuals in relevant contexts. 
Adjusting harm from Sally’s perspective follows a similarly predictable pattern. If Sally is simply 
congested, then it seems incorrect to say James has a moral responsibility to sacrifice his life or limbs 
to clear up Sally’s mild illness. Indeed, it is questionable whether James has a moral responsibility to 
even, say, donate blood plasma for the same end despite it being a minimal cost. These observations 
strongly suggest various judgments of moral responsibility are underwritten by a principle stronger 
than NON-MALFEASANCE, codifying responsibility not simply to refrain from harmful actions, 
but to in fact provide aid to others in need.  
The following – which we might think of as a magnification of NON-MALFEASANCE – 
then appear to obtain in certain contexts: 
BENEFICENCE For agents S, S’, context C, and action A: If A aids S’ in C then S has a 
prima facie moral responsibility in C to perform A 
What counts as providing aid to another here is broad; it may include substantial investment of time 
and energy in the cultivation of virtuous listening skills, but it also might consist in simply directing 
those in need to experts better able to offer assistance. As before, judgments of moral responsibility 
to provide aid in various contexts appear sensitive to one’s ability to provide that aid, one having 
 
31This, moreover, seems to be the case independently of whether James is the cause of Sally’s life-threatening condition. 
To be sure, if James is the cause of Sally’s life-threatening condition, then he seems to have more of a responsibility to 
donate blood plasma. 
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knowledge of one’s ability to provide aid, and knowledge of the effects of that aid. If James’s blood 
will clearly not affect Sally’s health, then it seems he has no moral responsibility to provide it for her. 
Similarly, if James’s blood will in fact save Sally’s life, but neither he nor anyone else knows that, 
then it seems again he has no moral responsibility to provide blood plasma to that end. Same for - 
rather artificial - contexts in which James’s blood could save Sally’s life and he knows this, but he is 
unaware Sally (or anyone else) needs or will need his blood plasma for that purpose.  
Returning to HJ, note BENEFICENCE involves moral responsibility substantial enough, 
it seems, to underwrite taking action to disseminate information concerning recently observed harms 
associated with implicit bias (Fricker, 2016). In that respect, this principle fits better with Fricker’s 
characterization of HJ. This fit becomes clearer when examining the sorts of conversational 
contexts Fricker targets in her discussion of HJ. BENEFICENCE appears to apply, say, to 
privileged listeners in circumstances in which marginalized speakers are attempting to render 
intelligible harmful experiences. Privileged listeners carry with them authority to validate or 
invalidate – broadly speaking – communicative attempts by marginalized speakers, as evidenced by 
Fricker’s detailed exposition of testimonial injustice (Fricker, 2007), Doston’s articulation of testimonial 
smothering, etc. (Dotson, 2011). Put another way, privileged conversational partners have the ability to 
help or harm marginalized speakers in relevant conversations. Moreover, moral harms associated 
with HI may be severe, undermining knowledge of oneself, affecting lives of loved ones, 
undermining autonomy, etc., and it appears in many contexts privileged listeners experience little 
cost in helping marginalized individuals understand harmful experiences. It is thus reasonable that 
privileged individuals listening to the difficulties marginalized speakers have in rendering harmful 
experiences intelligible are under at least a moral responsibility as strong as BENEFICENCE. This 
seems good motivation for understanding the moral aspect of HJ in part along the lines of this 
stronger moral principle.   
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 There are, as one should expect, caveats. Consider, privileged listeners who are legitimately 
unaware of the abilities they have in conversation with marginalized speakers may not bear moral 
responsibility to provide aid along the lines of BENEFICENCE. This may appear a cost to the 
principle since that suggests BENEFICENCE does not apply in contexts where privileged 
individuals are ignorant. Given the prevalence of, say, white ignorance this might make 
BENEFICENCE and the codified responsibility appear inapplicable in most contexts. To be sure, 
I think it is plausible BENEFICENCE does not apply to privileged individuals who are genuinely 
ignorant of their privilege and who are presented with marginalized speakers attempting to render 
intelligible harmful experiences. But most real-world contexts involve privileged individuals who 
have significant evidence that they are privileged, even in cases of white ignorance. True, privileged 
individuals are often motivated to disregard, ignore, or explain away such evidence, but they are 
nevertheless exposed to ample evidence of race, sex, disability, and age discrimination, among other 
forms. In that respect, they have reasons to suspect they bear privilege, insofar as they do not fall into 
such classes of individuals. Hence, they have reasons to suspect they bear such authority in 
conversation with marginalized individuals attempting to render harmful experiences intelligible.32 
Privileged individuals with such ample evidence are within purview of BENEFICENCE, and this 
condition seems met in most contexts involving privileged individuals.  
 One might grant the preceding but remain concerned that privileged listeners in relevant 
contexts may be outside the scope of BENEFICENCE even if they recognize they are able to help 
marginalized speakers avoid serious harm at little cost to themselves. If privileged individuals do not 
 
32My own experience here feels relevant. I am white, grew up in Georgia, was quite poor, and lived in a trailer park with 
my extended family, most of whom were conservative, exhibited racist tendencies, and inclined to either distort or 
ignore evidence that they might be wrong about their beliefs. Even so, living near equally poor families comprised of 
marginalized individuals made it clear to even the worst offenders of my family that we had privilege. This was evident 
by, say, the differences between how, educators, police, etc. treated us. I have since lived – and still do - in more 
affluent environments, surrounded by privileged, educated, middle and upper class individuals. They also appear aware 
of privilege. This is not to say my experience exhausts all possibilities of ignorance. It is simply to say scenarios in 
which privileged individuals are entirely ignorant of their privilege seem - in my experience - rare.  
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know how to provide aid to marginalized speakers exhibiting HI, it seems incorrect to say they 
nevertheless have a responsibility to provide aid. Indeed, privileged listeners may worry – rightly – 
that they might do more harm than good, and since NON-MALFEASANCE plausibly applies to 
them in such contexts, they bear a responsibility to refrain from action that is harmful to the 
speaker. To be sure, privileged individuals in such contexts might stumble upon a way to provide 
just the right help to marginalized speakers in contexts exhibiting HI. But toy soldiers are toys, not 
soldiers, and accidental virtues, mere accidents. The risk of potential harm in such contexts seems 
too great to leave to chance. This suggests BENEFICENCE does not apply to privileged agents in 
such contexts. Rather, privileged individuals bear responsibility underwritten by BENEFICENCE 
when they have evidence of the efficacy of aid they attempt to provide. Unfortunately, this requirement sharply 
delimits the number of contexts in which privileged individuals bear responsibility to aid 
marginalized speakers exhibiting HI, since it is plausible given the nature of HI, many privileged 
individuals presented with a marginalized individual struggling to make sense of harmful experiences 
will – rightly - lack confidence in the efficacy of help they might provide.  
 In sum: Our independently motivated contextual principles NON-MALFEASANCE and 
BENEFICENCE appear to line up with Fricker’s characterization of the moral aspect of HJ, yet 
the latter seems to exclude from responsibility agents who do not know how to provide aid 
effectively to those in need. Rather, given the potential harm one might expect arising from trying 
and failing to provide aid in such a scenario, and the force of NON-MALFEASANCE in such 
contexts, it seems agents should not, in fact, attempt to provide aid. What is needed to address this 
issue, it seems, is agents bearing a responsibility to learn to provide aid in future contexts. This, 
moreover, seems needed to capture Fricker’s choosing to describe HJ as a cultivated virtue (Fricker, 




3.3 Moral Aspect of HJ: Third Pass 
We make some progress by again reflecting on the above contextual features which influence 
judgments of moral responsibility. Privileged individuals who recognize they lack skills needed to 
provide aid to marginalized speakers in such contexts, gain evidence of an educational gap. This 
evidence, coupled with awareness of authority one has to (in)validate marginalized speakers in 
conversational contexts, and awareness of the significant harms associated with HI, creates a 
somewhat rare context for the privileged individual, and it has been shown judgments of moral 
responsibility are sensitive to rarity of provider’s ability to offer aid (Beverley, 2016; Beverly & 
Beebe, 2017).  
Consider, Rhesus disease kills millions of infants around the world, and there is – at present 
– not a cure that can be synthesized in a lab without the blood plasma of John Harrison. Harrison’s 
donations have saved the lives of approximately 2.4 million infants worldwide. It seems plausible he 
has a responsibility to donate. But it also seems Harrison is uniquely33 positioned to help, and this 
carries great responsibility to do so. To see this, consider if each of us knew we were able to provide 
blood plasma that could be used to synthesize a vaccine for Rhesus disease, but none of us donated, 
then we would have all done something morally wrong, but none of us would have obviously done 
anything worse than anyone else in this context (Beverley, 2016). In contrast, in our context where 
John Harrison is uniquely able to provide this aid and is aware of that fact, John refraining from 
donating blood plasma seems morally worse than it would be in the context where everyone – 
himself included – could donate but decided not to. Perceived rarity to provide aid thus seems to 
influence judgments of moral responsibility, and as with other features of contexts discussed, this 
influence has been supported empirically.  
 
33This implies luck influences responsibility, which is contentious (McMahon, 2002), though see (Beverley, 2016).  
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Since it seems rarity magnifies moral responsibility generally speaking and privileged 
individuals in contexts exhibiting HI who realize they are ill-equipped to provide aid find themselves 
in a rare position to help, there seems motivation for a moral responsibilities beyond that found in 
BENEFICENCE, namely, to learn to provide aid. We might characterize this as:  
MORAL EDUCATION For agents S, S’, S’’, and contexts C, C’: If S’ needs aid in 
C and S does not know how to provide that aid in C, then 
S has a prima facie moral responsibility to learn how to 
provide such aid to relevantly similar agent S’’ in similar 
context C’ 
With MORAL EDUCATION, we have an explanation based on contextual features for agents 
having a moral responsibility to learn to provide aid to others in various contexts. In particular, we 
have an explanation for privileged individuals in contexts exhibiting HI having a moral 
responsibility to cultivate virtuous listening skills, among others. This much aligns with Fricker’s 
brief characterization of HJ. Still, we might nevertheless worry that moral responsibility codified in 
MORAL EDUCATION is too easily undermined. Even if we fix contextual features so that 
privileged individuals in contexts exhibiting HI are aware of their own privilege and associated 
abilities to help, are confident in those abilities, and recognize how helpful they can be, there is still 
the question of cost to the provider. This is worrisome not because learning to provide efficacious 
aid to marginalized speakers in such contexts would itself be a great cost to privileged individuals, 
but because it seems it may in many cases be just costly enough to undermine responsibility given 
the fact that each of us have various projects, life goals, etc. that should be considered when 
evaluating overall cost. A privileged individual devoting most of her life to finding a cure for cancer, 
while raising a family, volunteering at various causes, practicing yoga for mental health, etc., might 
find little time to effectively learn to and develop confidence in providing aid to marginalized 
individuals in contexts exhibiting HI. Learning to provide aid to marginalized speakers in such 
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contexts may not be a negligible investment when weighed against other investments one has; as a 
result, the tradeoff between costs to oneself and benefits of providing aid to others might result in 
the responsibility adverted as applying to privileged individuals in MORAL EDUCATION being 
overridden in such contexts.  
How forceful this worry ultimately is depends largely on judgments of how costly education 
and practice is to a potential privileged provider. This in turn depends on how much time and effort 
learning strategies for providing aid in such context takes. Depending on the context, it may be a 
simple as learning to listen attentively, asking questions to keep conversation flowing, recognizing 
and attending to silences, or directing marginalized individuals to experts better able to help. In 
other contexts, in contrast, it may be as complicated as developing skills often found among clinical 
psychologists. At this point, I can only offer my intuition that privileged individuals in the former 
contexts more often than not bear the responsibility adverted in MORAL EDUCATION, while 
those in the latter – unless they, in fact, are clinical psychologists – do not obviously bear such 
substantial responsibilities.34 We revisit how moral and epistemic responsibilities may be magnified 
in institutional contexts in some detail below, but before then we turn to the epistemic aspect of HJ 
to provide a full picture of the putative remedy for HI.   
3.4 Epistemic Aspect of HJ: First Pass 
Fricker’s initial presentation of HJ provides a starting point for reflections on contextual features 
relevant to epistemic responsibility, though it seemed little more than a species of the sort of 
epistemic responsibility each of us already owes to one another:  
SUSPEND For agents S, S’ in context C: If S’ is having trouble articulating an 
experience, argument, counterexample, etc., to S, then S has a prima facie 
 
34Empirical work – which is currently in progress - is needed to examine how general the appealed to intuition is. 
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epistemic responsibility to refrain from inferring S’ is confused, 
nonsensical, etc.  
Insofar as one intends to engage in conversation with another, SUSPEND seems true. This is not, 
of course, to say we each have a responsibility to assume struggling interlocutors are never confused, 
nonsensical, etc. Indeed, in some cases it seems we should make such assumptions, e.g. students 
having trouble articulating questions about difficult philosophical material. Further, reflecting on 
differences between contexts in which this principle applies and when it does not reveals contextual 
features relevant to judgments of epistemic responsibility. To sharpen the analysis, focus on contexts 
where the speaker is attempting to, say, articulate an experience to themselves. As an example of a 
context in which the principle plausibly applies, consider a physicist encountering data suggesting a 
well-confirmed physical theory is false. This physicist would – rightly – be reluctant to immediately 
jettison the theory, but may nevertheless have difficulty explaining the new data; it seems incorrect 
to count them as confused or nonsensical, suggesting the responsibility adverted in SUSPEND 
applies to the physicist in this context. On the other hand, as an example of a context in which the 
principle does not seem to apply, consider an individual raised in a racist environment who acquires 
evidence that conflicts with his racist ideology. This individual might also struggle to make sense of 
this new evidence given his existing beliefs; but here it seems correct to count this individual as 
confused or nonsensical, suggesting the responsibility adverted in SUSPEND in this context is 
overridden. Roughly speaking, the epistemic difference between these cases seems to depend on a 
tradeoff between evidence one has for a set of beliefs that typically get the right results, and the 
amount and extent of counterevidence to those beliefs. A well-confirmed physical theory met with 
minimal counterevidence seems worth holding on to; racist beliefs learned from one’s environment 
are more frequently met with counterevidence than such physical theories.  
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 This tradeoff between contextual features influencing judgments of epistemic responsibility 
can be illustrated further by reflecting on a childhood anecdote shared by W.E.B. Du Bois (Du Bois, 
1903, pg. 16) which suggested an early struggle to understand why white children treated him 
differently. In this brief story, Du Bois suggests having considered several explanations for this 
different treatment, e.g. he was not as smart as other children, he was not as athletic, etc., and having 
formed such hypotheses, he tested them, e.g. attaining academic excellence, becoming a star athlete, 
disconfirming each. Ultimately, Du Bois concluded he was treated differently due to the color of his 
skin, given so many other putative explanations failed. Important for our purpose, is how 
epistemically responsible it would seem – at least initially – for Du Bois to attempt to explain why 
white children treated him differently based on obvious, available metrics, e.g. athleticism, 
intelligence, which no doubt often provided adequate explanations for differential treatment he 
witnessed among and between white children. These metrics likely seemed adequate for many 
purposes and confirmed to that extent. Du Bois on this reading is not – at least initially – concluding 
from his struggles that he is confused or nonsensical. Of course, Du Bois eventually acquired 
sufficient evidence suggesting these metrics were inadequate, at which point it seems plausible to say 
that he – as a matter of fact – was confused and realized this was so. This confusion, however, owed 
to inculcation into widespread privileged norms that circumscribed and emphasized certain 
explanations for experiences over others. In contexts with such mounting counterevidence to his 
previous beliefs, Du Bois no longer had an epistemic responsibility to refrain from considering 
himself confused, at least with respect to the beliefs and explanations he left behind. And this 
realization of confusion gave way35 to adequate understanding of his experiences employing an 
explanation based on color divisions, an explanation notably neither obvious nor widely available in 
 
35See (McAdams, 2015) and other personality research who explore the importance of understanding one’s life as a 
coherent and cohesive narrative, often involving re-evaluation of life events.   
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his environment. Again, this suggests judgments of epistemic responsibility are sensitive to tradeoffs 
between confirmations of one’s, say, beliefs and counterevidence to those beliefs.36  
Returning to HJ, initially presented the epistemic aspect of this phenomenon seems simply a 
specific instance of SUSPEND involving privileged and marginalized interlocutors. While 
interpreting HJ in this manner fits comfortably with Fricker’s insistence that HI – a structural 
injustice – does not have epistemically culpable perpetrators, understanding HJ in only this manner 
simply amounts to a reminder that we should be better communicators with respect to marginalized 
individuals. To be fair, given the prevalence of HI, there is value in emphasizing HJ even if it is little 
more than SUSPEND. Still, one might expect a more robust remedy to HI. As when examining the 
moral aspect, attention to contextual features which appear to influence judgments of epistemic 
responsibility motivates more substantial epistemic responsibilities in contexts exhibiting HI.  
3.5 Epistemic Aspect of HJ: Second Pass 
Specifically, more substantial epistemic responsibilities than those found in SUSPEND apply to 
privileged individuals in cases exhibiting HI because they have much to gain - epistemically speaking - 
in precisely these contexts (Medina, 2017a; 2017b). As argued by Medina, among others, 
marginalized individuals provide insight into epistemic blind-spots, meta-resistance, etc. learning of 
which would be epistemically beneficial for non-marginalized individuals. It is plausible that in 
contexts where privileged individuals may reap significant epistemic benefits, they have greater 
epistemic responsibility than that adverted in SUSPEND. Medina (Medina, 2017b, pg. 48) has 
suggested a preliminary list of critical reflective capacities and strategies virtuous listeners exhibiting 
HJ might employ, e.g. recognize when to remain silent, suspend judgment about another’s 
intelligibility, listen for silences, let others set discussion dynamics, etc. which may result in such 
 
36As an aside, this story also suggests crucial points of recognition of confusion leading to deeper understanding of one’s 
experiences, might track whether (E-NRM) applies across context. We do not pursue that here.    
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epistemic benefits. And some of Medina’s suggestions seem motivated independent of contexts 
exhibiting HI. Suppose a graduate student meets with his dissertation committee chair to brainstorm 
an idea for a dissertation chapter.37 If the advisor – an expert in the relevant field – immediately 
offers a rather complete suggestion and attempts to begin working through the details of the idea 
with the student, this might – rightly – upset the student, who may feel they came to a meeting 
intending to brainstorm and share their own ideas, but is now in a position where they feel 
compelled to either engage with the advisor’s detailed idea or explain why they do not want to 
engage with the suggestion. Either way, it seems in such a context alternative ideas are obscured in 
part due to, say, the completeness of the advisor’s suggestion, the epistemic authority of the advisor 
as a source of knowledge, and the conversational setting. Such an outcome might have been avoided 
had the advisor let the student set the conversational agenda, noticed the student’s silence or 
discomfort if there was either, etc.  
The potential for obfuscation is magnified when marginalized speakers are addressing those 
with privilege. Suppose Du Bois had confided in a white advisor who proceeded to offer plausible, 
coherent, explanations for the behavior of the white children, such as those Du Bois himself actually 
considered. It is plausible such explanations might have carried more weight coming from outside, 
and in particular from a white adult advisor, and so may have caused Du Bois serious epistemic 
harm insofar as they obscured the more likely explanation from consideration. Du Bois would have 
found himself defending why these alternative explanations were inadequate, rather than seeking out 
an alternative to these suggested alternatives. Here we have epistemic authority combined with 
plausible, complete, rather widespread explanations for a harmful experience, which obscure 
exploration of alternative explanations.  
 
37Many thanks to Hollen Reischer for assistance in thinking through the consequences of this example.  
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We might codify Medina’s independently motivated suggestions in the following principle, 
capturing a more robust epistemic responsibility than that found in SUSPEND:  
CHARITY For agents S, S’ in context C: If S’ is having trouble articulating an 
experience, argument, counterexample, etc., to S in C, then S has a prima 
facie epistemic responsibility to employ virtuous listening strategies  
Much as with BENEFICENCE, this principle does not address contexts in which agents lack the 
needed skills. Fortunately, in this case the stronger principle appears motivated already, given the 
epistemic benefits of rooting out blind spots and meta-resistance. That is, assuming a privileged 
individual lacking virtuous listening skills is aware that contexts involving HI might be opportunities 
to reap significant epistemic benefits in the form of identifying and overcoming epistemic blind 
spots and meta-resistance, they have an epistemic responsibility to acquire those virtuous listening 
skills for use in similar future contexts.  
3.6 Epistemic Aspect of HJ: Third Pass 
One might worry requiring privileged listener awareness – in contexts exhibiting HI – of 
opportunities to overcome epistemic blind spots and meta-resistance, is too restrictive (Medina, 
2013). Epistemic blind spots for our purposes arise when privileged individuals either do not see 
certain evidence of the existence of marginalization as actually evidence of marginalization (Medina, 
2013, pg. 66). Meta-resistance understood here amounts to privileged individual difficulties in 
recognizing they have blind spots (Medina, 2013, pg. 66-69). The worry is that the very nature of 
epistemic blind spots and meta-resistance makes such awareness difficult. This in turn might 
undermine any epistemic responsibility many privileged individuals might have to cultivate virtuous 
listening skills for use in relevant contexts. Du Bois appears to provide an example of the possibility 
of overcoming meta-resistance and recognizing epistemic blind spots, and examining this success 
sharpens the concern with respect to privileged individuals. Du Bois experienced harm resistant to 
readily available explanations, leading to recognition of an epistemic blind spot and adoption of an 
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alternative perspective through which to understand his experience. But this success depended 
largely – it seemed – on failures to make sense of harmful experiences given dominant, readily 
available, cultural resources. In contrast, the white children in his environment likely felt no need to 
appeal to explanations for their experiences outside those readily available in dominant, prevalent, 
cultural norms at the time. This might suggest privileged individuals often will not recognize 
contexts exhibiting HI as opportunities to overcome epistemic blind spots, indeed perhaps due to 
those very blind spots. If so, CHARITY seems inapplicable to privileged individuals in such 
contexts.  
 At this point, many have suggested strategies and tactics for providing sufficient evidence to 
privileged individuals with epistemic blind spots exhibiting meta-resistance, e.g. (Medina, 2017a; 
2017b) suggests we engage in hermeneutical friction and sometimes respond to micro-aggression 
with counter micro-aggression, (Lorde, 1981) suggests a plausible use of anger along similar lines, 
etc. These suggestions aside, it seems nevertheless plausible privileged individuals with such blind 
spots and meta-resistance have sufficient evidence of these epistemic problems to bear 
responsibility. Indeed, focusing on the evidence privileged individuals in, say, the present U.S., it is 
hard to see how most do not have sufficient evidence of blind spots and meta-resistance to 
recognizing them. Simply put, there is enough of a predictable pattern of marginalized individuals 
already exhibiting anger, claiming privileged individuals have blind spots and exhibit meta-resistance, 
and discussion of harms stemming from discrimination, throughout the history of this country to 
suggest the presence of both epistemic blind spots and meta-resistance among privilege individuals.38 
Moreover, it is a short step from recognition of the possibility of epistemic blind spots and meta-
resistance concerning issues of marginalization, to recognizing opportunities to overcome these 
 
38Expressions implicit in this discussion such as “Sam recognizes an epistemic blind spot” are ambiguous between de 
dicto and de re recognition readings, i.e. “Sam is such that he recognizes an epistemic blind spot” vs “There is some 
epistemic blind spot such that Sam recognizes it.” I have in mind here the former, de dicto recognition, reading.   
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epistemic problems in discussion with marginalized individuals. This is all to say, one might worry 
CHARITY is too restrictive since application requires privileged individuals be aware of epistemic 
blind spots and meta-resistance, but it seems most privileged individuals in our present society have 
ample evidence suggesting the presence of such epistemic problems, and so CHARITY seems – as 
a matter of fact – applicable in such contexts.  
Moreover, once this concern over constraints on CHARITY is removed, given the obvious 
benefits one might acquire in overcoming epistemic blind spots and meta-resistance, it seems 
plausible relevant individuals have an epistemic responsibility to learn skills that might assist in 
overcoming such epistemic problems. Restricting attention to scenarios that might exhibit HI, the 
following principle seems supported:  
EPISTEMIC EDUCATION For agents S, S’, and contexts C: If S’ is having 
trouble articulating an experience, argument, 
counterexample, etc., to S in C and S does not have 
critical reflective capacities or virtuous listening 
strategies to employ, then S has a prima facie epistemic 
responsibility to cultivate such virtues and capacities 
in the interest of employing them in when engaged 
with relevantly similar agents and contexts 
As with the moral principles discussed earlier, we can understand the relationships among 
SUSPEND, CHARITY, and EPISTEMIC EDUCATION in terms of context-sensitivity, where 
the first provides a base epistemic responsibility sensitive to and so potentially magnified by 
tradeoffs between evidence and counterevidence, as well as potential epistemic gains associated with 
the context.  
3.7 Combining Moral and Epistemic Aspects of HJ 
With these epistemic principles, we seem close to what Fricker appears to have in mind by 
suggesting HJ involves cultivation of virtuous listening strategies. Indeed, combining these 
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principles with NON-MALEFEASANCE, BENEFICENCE, and MORAL EDUCATION 
provides an independently motivated explication of both the moral and epistemic aspects of HJ, 
which offers a general explanation for judgments of moral and epistemic responsibilities we seem to 
have in scenarios exhibiting HI. Privileged individuals in contexts exhibiting HI plausibly either bear 
moral and epistemic responsibilities to employ strategies to aid marginalized speakers, or moral and 
epistemic responsibilities to learn such strategies and cultivate associated virtues. Moreover, 
appealing to such contextual features allows a clear distinction between moral and epistemic of 
responsibility in relevant contexts. An avowed racist may recognize the epistemic benefits of helping 
marginalized individuals render harmful experiences intelligible, since this may provide insights into 
epistemic blind spots, meta-resistance, etc., but they may engage in this behavior in an effort to 
sustain those blind spots, etc., in others. That is, they might develop and employ virtuous listening 
strategies for immoral purposes. Such an individual would align with the above epistemic 
responsibilities while failing to satisfy the moral responsibilities.  
We turn next to resistance one might have in adopting these principles, replies, and two 
applications which strengthen the case for adopting them. 
4. Objections, Replies, and Proof of Concept 
Much of the substantial responsibilities discussed thus far seem compatible with Fricker’s 
characterization of HJ. That said, one might worry these principles may underwrite more substantial 
responsibilities than Fricker is inclined to attribute, given HI is understood to be largely a structural 
problem. I argue Fricker should adopt these principles in any event. In addition to offering a clear 
explanation of responsibility in various contexts and being independently motivated, these principles 
largely align with what little Fricker suggests concerning HJ, and potentially provide responses to 
criticisms that Fricker’s characterization of HJ is too individualistic to address structural injustices 
like HI. Moreover, as proof of concept, I examine how these principles make sense of Fricker’s 
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commitment to sometimes significant institutional responsibilities, how individuals may bear 
substantial responsibilities to address injustices, and how marginalized individuals may not bear 
responsibilities to educate privileged interlocutors.  
4.1 Resistance to Substantial Responsibility  
Fricker should grant principles at least as strong as SUSPEND and NON-MALFEASANCE 
underwrite HJ, but also that in contexts exhibiting HI, these principles may be magnified and 
consequently may generate significant epistemic and moral responsibilities for privileged listeners 
exposed to communicative attempts by marginalized speakers. However, Fricker might protest 
adopting, say, some combination of CHARITY, BENEFICENCE, EPISTEMIC 
EDUCATION, and MORAL EDUCATION runs the risk of imposing too much responsibility 
on individuals who are perpetuating the structural injustice of HI, but who are not themselves 
obviously culpable. In addition to the reasons provided in the previous section, there are at least two 
further reasons for Fricker to adopt this proposal. First, Fricker provides conceptual space for great 
responsibility in certain contexts,39 by claiming agents might be morally/epistemically responsible for 
behaviors even if they are not blameworthy for those behaviors. An individual, for instance, who 
takes great precautions against implicit bias, whose behavior is nevertheless non-culpably influenced 
by such bias, upon realization of the subsequent harms stemming from the associated harmful 
behavior, is not blameworthy – Fricker urges - but is responsible for that behavior. Fricker suggests 
regret the individual might feel, and later actions that individual might take to prevent engaging in 
similarly harmful behavior, are best described by recognition of responsibility, even absent blame. 
This suggests room for attributing perhaps significant responsibility in certain contexts, in 
accordance with principles stronger than SUSPEND and NON-MALFEASANCE, even absent 
 
39I have in mind (Fricker, 2016)’s discussion of agent-regret.  
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blame.40 For even epistemically innocent privileged individuals are often in positions of relative 
power when communicating with members of marginalized groups, and this is particularly true 
when the latter are struggling to render harmful experiences intelligible to the former. Whether they 
are or are not at epistemically or morally blameworthy is beside the point; plumbers fix leaks because 
they can, not because they cause the leak.  
Second, HJ is meant to address HI, but as discussed in Section 2, the latter phenomenon is 
a symptom of an underlying disease, namely, HM. Absent some way of treating the disease, it seems 
likely the symptoms will continue to manifest. Fricker seems aware HJ should in some way address 
HM. She claims (Fricker, 2007, pgs. 154) with enough instances of HJ addressing instances of HI, 
even the underlying HM will be remedied. This proposal has been met with several criticisms 
(Dotson, 2011; Medina, 2013).  Simply put, the problem is that HM is structural and resistant to 
change if limited to the cultivation of individual virtues underwritten by principles as minimal as 
SUSPEND and NON-MALFEASANCE; indeed, if Fricker’s proposed remedy to HI is to treat 
more than merely the symptoms of the disease, then more substantial responsibility should be 
expected at the level of individuals.41 The context-sensitive epistemic and moral principles defended 
here seem fitting in this respect, and to that extent should be accepted by Fricker as constitutive of 
 
40I take these principles to support (Fricker, 2016)’s claim that epistemic agent-regret may play a motivational role when, say, 
an epistemically blameless writing-sample assessor is motivated to change future behaviors having gained new evidence 
that previous complacency was harmful, i.e. new evidence her behaviors conflict with BENEFICENCE and 
CHARITY.  
41For example, Fricker’s suggestion that localized virtues engender structural change has been criticized as misguided 
(Anderson, 2012), and her general theory of epistemic injustice accused of overlooking and perhaps perpetuating 
injustices worth addressing (Polhaus, 2012). Additionally, one might worry HJ is insufficient, practically speaking, to 
address HI given the substantial resistance privileged individuals exhibit when confronted with their ignorance. (Mills, 
2007)’s careful study of “white ignorance” and (Medina, 2017)’s subsequent generalizations to “meta-resistance” and 
“meta-ignorance” provide grist for this mill. Borrowing (Nguyen, 2019)’s terminology, we might characterize privileged 




HJ. The principles and responsibilities codified in them are broader than HI, and so may extend 
beyond HJ to address the underlying conditions.42 
4.2 Proofs of Concept  
Two further applications of the epistemic and moral principles I claim should be constitutive of HJ 
strengthen the case. Observe, Fricker (Fricker, 2012) is amenable to extensions of HJ in institutional 
contexts in which clinical psychologists treat patients, marginalized or otherwise. Specifically, Fricker 
includes under the purview of HJ agents inhabiting institutional roles carrying significant 
responsibilities comparable those codified in CHARITY, BENEFICENCE, EPISTEMIC 
EDUCATION, and MORAL EDUCATION, such as investing time to build trust, guiding 
patients towards understanding cognitive dissonance, and the importance of struggling to render 
harmful experiences intelligible to oneself. The fact that clinical psychologists willingly enter into 
these roles with the purpose of aiding others, coupled with Fricker’s willingness to accept such 
agents may have substantial responsibilities to aid their clients, motivates accepting magnifications of 
the context-sensitive principles underwriting HJ, associated with institutional roles: 
 MORAL PROFESSIONAL Agent S in role R in institutional context C has a 
prima facie moral responsibility to aid others through 
fulfillment of potentially substantial responsibilities 
associated with R when S can do so 
And:  
EPISTEMIC PROFESSIONAL Agent S in role R in institutional context C – 
often therapeutic in nature - has a prima facie 
epistemic responsibility to actively address 
behavioral cues correlated with known signals of 
coping mechanisms observed in clients who may 
 
42The force of this suggestion, of course, depends on whether and to what extent one can uncover moral and epistemic 
features of contexts sufficiently magnifying needed responsibilities to generate, say, collective epistemic and moral 
responsibilities. I take this to be a natural next step of the analysis, but unfortunately do not have the space to engage in 
that extraction here.  
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be disinclined to attempt to render harmful 
experiences intelligible  
The moral harms prevented in relevant contexts seem sufficient to motivate MORAL 
PROFESSIONAL while the epistemic benefits (Beverley & Reischer, 2019; Reischer & Cowan, 
2020). clinical therapists might acquire through such training and how those benefits align with 
occupational role goals, strongly suggest EPISTEMIC PROFESSIONAL applies as well. And 
with these principles in mind as targets, we might even extend responsibility outside of institutional 
roles to cases of mere HM in certain contexts.43 For example, in CASE 2 – which exhibited HM 
but not HI owing to the fact that Sally did not attempt to render her experiences intelligible to 
herself or others – we might expect HJ as a partial remedy.44 And given the significant harm Sally 
experiences in this case, it seems plausible more than the rather limited SUSPEND and NON-
MALFEASANCE would apply to clinical psychologists working with Sally. This is precisely what 
one should expect; for it is unclear how waiting to interpret a marginalized speaker charitably would 
be helpful if they are not inclined to speak at all. What seems needed is not just virtuous listening, 
but attention to behavior correlated with cognitive coping mechanisms, e.g. anxiety, inability to 
maintain long-term relationships, substance abuse, etc. Relatedly, institutional roles aside, it seems 
plausible family and friends occupy roles sufficient to ground responsibilities more substantial than 
CHARITY, EPISTEMIC EDUCATION, BENEFICENCE and MORAL EDUCATION, 
but even if one is skeptical about attributing such significant responsibility to these individuals, they 
at least seem to bear a responsibility to direct Sally to experts better equipped to help. Moreover, I 
 
43For example, these principles would accommodate Medina’s hermeneutical death with respect to treatment.   
44I agree with Medina that fighting HI requires hermeneutical resistance, though he focuses largely on justification for 
deployment of insurrection strategies in cases of epistemic death.  
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suspect they would implicitly acknowledge such responsibility to do so if, as seems a plausible 
thought, they ever wished they knew how they might help Sally.45   
 Consider next46 an application of these moral and epistemic principles to marginalized 
individuals confronted with privileged individuals unable to understand marginalized experiences. 
This is a case of what Fricker calls minimal-HI, where the conceptual gap in the collective 
hermeneutical resources owes to speaker and listener operating with non-overlapping conceptual 
resources. Above, we focused on the perspective of privileged individuals to motivate epistemic and 
moral responsibilities. Of the former sort, we urged that privileged individuals had much to gain 
epistemically speaking, by engaging with marginalized individuals since this might uncover blind 
spots and meta-resistance. But we should take care not to venture into epistemic exploitation in such 
scenarios (Bernstein, 2016). Marginalized listeners knowingly able to help privileged individuals 
render their own harmful experiences intelligible do not necessarily have a responsibility to do so. 
Specifically, if assisting in this manner makes marginalized listeners more vulnerable to exploitation, 
oppression, discrediting, etc., then the costs to provide aid seem too high to correctly claim a moral 
responsibility to provide that aid (Medina, 2013, pg. 116; Baldwin, 1979). In such contexts the 
tradeoff between benefits provided and costs to the provider seems paramount, and sufficient in 
many cases to override even the rarity of a given marginalized individual in a given conversation to 
educate a privileged individual. For marginalized individuals have much evidence that such 
assistance is often ineffective, underappreciated, and liable to generate harmful stereotypes, among 
 
45These remarks concerning responsibilities associated with roles extend across important areas of social life. Physicians, 
for example, bear robust responsibilities when treating patients, overlapping those outlined in the preceding sections. 
Similarly, lawyers discharging various duties acquire extensive responsibilities to help others, as do police officers and 
members of the military. Each of these offices involves nuance worth exploring with respect to responsibilities, but 
what seems common to each is robust responsibility to help themselves and others. See (Monaghan, 2018) for a recent 
discussion of police duties to disobey unjust laws.  
46Thanks to an anonymous reviewer at Episteme for suggesting discussion of epistemic exploitation.  
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other costs.47 In short, to the question of whether marginalized individuals bear moral and epistemic 
responsibility to educate privileged individuals when given the opportunity, I say this largely depends 
on the costs associated with providing such education and the confidence providers have that 
offering such education will be effective. Moreover, it seems there are good reasons to think both of 
those conditions weigh against moral and epistemic responsibilities attaching to marginalized 
individuals in many such contexts. Hence, the context-sensitive moral and epistemic principles 
defended here seem insulated from charges of justifying epistemic exploitation. They also reveal, as 
should be obvious, the deep complexity of determining responsibility in such contexts.  
4.3 Conclusion  
Having articulated necessary and sufficient conditions for HI, I argued Fricker’s proposed remedy - 
HJ - is best understood as constituted by context-sensitive principles that may generate significant 
epistemic and moral responsibility. Generally, we should listen to and not harm others, but when 
marginalized individuals are struggling to render experiences intelligible to privileged individuals, the 
latter have more substantial responsibilities to help. I outlined various caveats concerning these 
principles, reflecting both the complexity of judgments of moral and epistemic responsibility and 
contexts in which we might find either. I then argued that though Fricker may balk at accepting 
these principles and the sometimes substantial responsibility they codify, they provide much needed 
content to HJ, have a clear explanation for the generation of responsibilities on contextual grounds, 
are defensible independently of HI and so in that sense may even apply to address background 
conditions against which the injustice arises, and appear to get the right results when examining 
complicated scenarios such as responsibilities clinical psychologists bear towards clients as 
occupants of institutional roles, and when considering whether marginalized individuals have 
 
47Note, I do not claim the absence of responsibility in these cases stems from the fact that marginalized individuals are 
not at fault for the conditions they find themselves in. The contextual approach I have taken here finds responsibility 
independently of personal fault.  
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responsibilities to educate privileged individuals. I thus conclude Fricker has overwhelming reasons 
to adopt the explication of HJ offered here. 
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